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Abstract
An important theme in information systems research is that organizational factors are critical to the success
of computer investments. This paper provides broad statistical evidence for this proposition.  For our analysis,
we have compiled a unique data set of over 1,000 firms which includes the total stock market value of firms,
their installed base of computer capital, detailed measures of the organizational structures, and a battery of
other factors. 
Using a theoretically-grounded model, we find that a one dollar increase in a firm’s installed computer capital
is associated with an increase in the firm’s stock market valuation of over five dollars, while controlling for
all other tangible assets.  For this to be equilibrium, the financial markets must believe that each dollar of
computer capital is accompanied by an average of over four dollars of intangible assets.  We then identify a
candidate for these intangible assets:  certain organizational characteristics, involving the structure of decision-
making and the nature of job design, are highly correlated with computer investments.  While these organiza-
tional characteristics do not appear on a firm’s balance sheet, we find that they lead to higher stock market
valuations.  
Strikingly, firms that combine higher computer investments with these organizational characteristics have
disproportionate increases in their market valuations.  Our findings are quite robust to a variety of alternative
models and the results are generally strengthened when we control for potential reverse causality.  We
conclude that the contribution of computers to a firm’s market value is increased when they are combined with
certain intangible assets, specifically including the cluster of organizational changes that we have identified.
Intangible Assets
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1. INTRODUCTION
A major theme of recent work on information systems research is that investment in computers and other types of information
technology (IT) needs to be coupled with boundary-spanning organizational changes in order to be effective. Similarly, scholars
of organizational studies predict that new technologies “will require the development of new organizational forms and systems,
such as teams and new incentive systems, which decentralize decision making…and harness the knowledge and intelligence of
all members of the organization” (Florida and Kenney 1993).   While the traditional, functional division of labor that dominated
the industrial economy was efficient in economizing on information processing and communication costs, it can be dysfunctional
in an age of cheap information ushered in by computers.  In particular, when the costs of information processing and communica-
tions change radically, the optimal allocation of decision rights, human capital and incentive systems are likely to change as well
(Anand and Mendelson 1997; Wyner and Malone 1997).
Numerous case examples highlight the importance of coupling computer investments with complementary changes in organiza-
tion.  Studies of the implementation of Lotus Notes (Orlikowski 1992) have shown that without organizational structures and
incentives to promote information sharing, group collaboration and knowledge sharing features of groupware applications may
go largely unused.  Similar challenges have been documented in manufacturing environments where new information systems
increased the need for cognitive skills in the work force (Zuboff and Bronsema 1984).  However, the organizations that are
effectively able to make concurrent computer investments and organizational “investments” often reap substantial benefits,
although reports of high failure rates of business process redesign projects attest to the difficulty of this change (Sauer and Yetton
1997).
These cases suggest the both the high value and high costs of these types of additional investments.  While these costs of
organizational change create a barrier to the successful use of computers, the other side of the coin is that once firms have
incurred such costs, they have something—a new business process, a new organizational form, a new set of supplier relations
—that other firms cannot duplicate easily.  In economic terms, they have created new assets.
But is all this painful restructuring worth it? Are their any measurable economic benefits associated with these new “intangible
assets”?
We formally test the hypothesis that these intangible assets complement information technology capital just as aluminum wings
complement jet engines.  Complementary assets are more valuable when used together than when used separately.  To realize
the potential benefits of computerization, additional “assets,” like worker knowledge, new organizational structures, or
redesigned incentive systems, may be needed.
If these intangible assets really exist, they should be detectable in at least two ways.  First, resulting effect on the firm’s market
valuation should be measurable, even when the underlying assets cannot be seen or touched.  The financial markets, which seek
to assess the discounted value of future revenues, provide a valuable telltale for whether these investments are generating value
for the owners of the firm.   In particular, the market value of a firm which has leveraged computer assets with organizational
investments should be greater than that of a similar firm which has not incurred these investments.  A computer that is combined
with complementary intangible assets should be significantly more valuable to a business than a computer in a box on the loading
dock.
Second, some of the specific changes that firms make may be directly observable.  In particular, numerous authors have
suggested that IT is likely to be associated with organizational changes such as greater demand for worker skills and increased
levels of employee discretion and decision-making authority (Applegate, Cash and Mills 1988; George and King 1991; Sauer
and Yetton 1997).  If these practices represent the types of organizational assets we described earlier, then we would expect that
the value of IT would be greater in organizations that also adopt these work practices.
Therefore, we can assert the following hypotheses:
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Hypothesis 1:  If computer capital is complementary with unmeasured, intangible assets, then firms with
higher levels of computerization should have higher stock market valuations, even after controlling for all
measured assets on their balance sheets.
Hypothesis 2:  If computer capital is complementary with certain organizational characteristics (e.g., broader
job responsibilities for line workers, more use of self-managing teams), then firms with higher levels of
computerization should have higher levels of these variables, even after controlling for other characteristics
such as industry, year, size, and other assets.
Hypothesis 3:  If these organizational characteristics create value, as other assets do, then firms with higher
levels of these characteristics should have higher stock market valuations, even after controlling for all
measured assets on their balance sheets.
Hypothesis 4:  If computer capital is complementary with certain organizational characteristics, then firms
with both higher levels of computerization and higher levels of these characteristics should have dispropor-
tionately higher stock market valuations, even after controlling for other relevant variables.
Using data on 1,031 large firms over eight years (1987-1994), we find strong evidence in support of all four hypotheses. 
1. Each dollar invested in computers increases firm market valuation of from $5 to $20 (depending on the assumptions of the
estimation models), compared with an increase of about $1 per dollar of investment in other assets. 
2. Firms that are high IT users are also more likely to adopt work practices that involve a cluster of organizational characteris-
tics, including greater use of teams and broader decision authority. 
3. This cluster of organizational characteristics increases a firm’s market valuation, and furthermore, these organizational
characteristics explain some, but not all, of the unusually large valuation of computers. 
4. Firms that use these organizational characteristics have a disproportionately higher market valuation of their computers
assets. 
Our results are robust to a variety of alternative estimating techniques.  Most importantly, they cannot be explained by “reverse
causality” running from higher stock market values to greater IT investments.  They are consistent with earlier case-based
research as well as recent econometric work using production functions.  Taken together, these results lend strong quantitative
support to the idea that IT is most valuable when coupled with complementary changes in organizational design. 
In section 2, we present a sketch of the theoretical model and the data, in section 3 we present our statistical results, and we
conclude with a summary and discussion in section 4. 
2. ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND DATA
2.1 Derivation of Model for Stock Market Valuations
In this subsection, we sketch the derivation of the stock market valuation model.  Additional detail is provided in Appendix A.
 The basic structure of the model follows the literature on the valuation of capital goods that relates the market value of a firm
to the capital goods a firm owns (Brynjolfsson and Yang 1997; Hayashi 1982;  Hayashi and Inoue 1991; Wildasin 1984).  This
literature is often referred to as the “Tobin’s q” literature after the pioneering work by James Tobin (1969) in understanding the
Intangible Assets
1Tobin’s q is a ratio of the market value of a firm (including debt and equity) to the book value of its assets.
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relationship between firm value and capital investment.1  This framework has been empirically adapted and applied to the
valuation of R&D by Griliches (1981) and by Hall (1993a, 1993b) and the stock market impact of diversification (Montgomery
and Wernerfelt 1988).  
We assume that firms face the following dynamic optimization problem in which managers make capital investments (I) in
several different asset types and expenditures in variable costs (N) with the goal of maximizing the market value of the firm V.
In turn, V is equal to the present value of all future profits. The accumulation of capital investment, less depreciation (*) produces
a vector of capital stock (K, which includes different components of capital Kj). We use the subscript j as an index for each of
the different capital goods.  The capital stock along with variable inputs is used to produce output (F). Unlike traditional
production function analyses, we assume that there is some additional cost of making a capital investment which represents an
“organizational adjustment cost” (’(I,K,t)).  These organizational costs represent the amount of output lost while integrating
additional capital into the firm.  This yields the following program:
(1) Maximize
I,N
V(0) ’ I40B(t)u(t)dt
(2) where  B(t) ’ F(K,N, t)&’(I,K, t))&N&1
(3) given, dKj
dt
’ I&j
J
j’1
*jKj , for all j’1, . . . , J.
One can solve for the market value of the firm that results from this optimization problem (see Appendix A).  If there are no
organizational adjustment costs needed to make capital assets fully productive [’(I,K,t)=0], then buying a firm is no different
from buying a collection of separate assets.  Thus, the market value of a firm is simply equal to the current stock of capital assets:
(4) V ’ j
J
j’1
Kj
However, if there are organizational adjustment costs required to make full use of capital, then the value of an ongoing firm may
exceed the value of its separate capital assets.  The higher value represents the additional “intangible assets” created when each
of the capital assets is integrated into the firm.  In this case, the value of the firm is the sum of capital assets, but weighted by
the size of the organizational adjustment costs, 8:
(5) V ’ j
J
j’1
8jKj.
For example, if there are two types of capital, computers (c) and other capital (k), then  (8c – 1) would represent the difference
in value between computer capital which is fully integrated into the firm vs. computers which are available on the open market,
and  (8k – 1)  would be the corresponding value for other types of capital.   We can then calculate the size of the complementary
organizational investments by comparing how much the market values a capital asset that is part of a running firm as compared
to the same asset sold separately.
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2Return on assets captures short run profit effects that may influence stock market valuation.  Advertising and R&D capture other  types of
nonstandard assets that have been considered in prior work.  Finally, we add additional control variables for industry to reduce sample
heterogeneity and time to control for general economic trends in stock market valuation. Control variables include return on assets, R&D ratio,
advertisement ratio, industry dummies (usally SIC 2-digits), and year dummies.
3Our methodology is an example of hedonic regression, which estimates the market’s valuation using cross-sectional and time series variations
in the market value and the computer capital of the firm. An interesting alternative for measuring the impact of IT on the market value might
be an event study methodology. For example Dos Santos, Peffers, and Mauer (1993) and Im, Dow, and Grover (1998) found an interesting
positive relationship between IT investment announcements and market value of the firm.
4In addition, to control for heterogeneity among firms and to gauge the robustness of our results, we will also perform the estimates using fixed
effects and “between” regression, which enables us to separate out effects due to variation over time for the same firm and effects due to
variation across firms.  These techniques will be discussed further in the results section.
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2.2 Econometric Issues of Market Valuation
To translate the result of our dynamic optimization model into a specification suitable for empirical testing, we need to specify
the different types of capital that we will consider and a set of additional control variables (X) that are likely to influence this
relationship. We also sometimes include a firm effect term, ", to capture residual firm differences that are not explained by other
control variables. Including an error term, ,, we have our estimation equation: 
(6) Vit ’ "1 % j
J
j’1
8jKj,it % Xit( % ,it
Here, i, t, and j are indices of firms, time, and different capital goods, respectively. The coefficients to be estimated are (vectors)
", 8, and (.
Extending the prior literature on estimates of Tobin’s q, we divide assets into three categories:  computers, physical assets
(property, plant, and equipment), and other balance sheet assets (receivables, inventories, goodwill, cash, and other assets).  For
the other control variables (X) we will use return on assets, the ratio of R&D capital to assets, and the ratio of advertising expense
to assets.2  This yields our base estimating equation, which we will extend to include organizational investments:
(7) Vit ’ "i % 8cKc,it % 8pKp,it % 8oKo,it % controls % ,it
Here Kc, Kp, and Ko represent computer capital, physical capital, and other balance sheet assets, respectively.3
There are two issues about this specification that warrant concern. The first problem is that larger firms are likely to have larger
residuals that may unduly influence the regression estimates.  This can be addressed by using a generalized (or weighted) least
squares technique (GLS) to dampen the influence of large residuals.  Alternatively, we can use robust regression techniques (least
absolute deviation—LAD), which is less sensitive to outliers of all sorts.
A second concern is the potential for reverse causality.  While our model seeks to measure whether changes in the value of a
firm’s capital assets affect its stock market value, it may also be the case that unexpected increases in stock market valuations
lead firms to make increased investment in capital assets.  To reduce this problem, we apply the standard technique of instrumen-
tal variables regression (two stage least squares or 2SLS).4
Intangible Assets
5Another potential source of error in this regard is the outsourcing of computer facilities. Fortunately, to the extent that the computers reside
on the client site, they will still be properly counted by CII’s census.
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2.3 Data Sources and Construction
The data set used for this analysis is a panel of computer capital and stock market valuation data for 1,000 firms over the 1987
to 1994 time period, matched to a cross sectional survey of organizational practices conducted in 1995 and 1996.  A brief
description of each data source follows with additional detail in Appendix B.
Computer Technology:  The measures of computer use were derived from the Computer Intelligence Infocorp (CII) installation
database that details IT spending by site for companies in the Fortune 1000 (approximately 25,000 sites were aggregated to form
the measures for the 1,000 companies that represent the total population in any given year).  This database is compiled from
telephone surveys that detail the ownership of computer equipment and related products.  Most sites are updated at least annually
with more frequent sampling for larger sites.  The year-end state of the database from 1987 to 1994 was used for the computer
measures.  From this data, we obtain the total capital stock of computers (central processors, personal computers, and peripher-
als).  The IT data do not include all types of information processing or communication equipment and are likely to miss that
portion of computer equipment that is purchased by individuals or departments without the knowledge of information systems
personnel.5
Organizational Practices:  The organizational practices data in this analysis uses a series of surveys of large firms.   These
surveys adapted questions from prior surveys on human resource practices and workplace transformation (Huselid 1995;
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prunnushi 1997; Osterman 1994).  The questions address the allocation of various types of decision-
making authority, the use of self-managing teams, the breadth of job responsibilities, and other miscellaneous characteristics of
the workplace (further detail appears in the results section).  Organizational data were collected in three waves, covering most
of the Fortune 1000.  A total of 416 firms provided at least some data for the study.  Because some firms on the organizational
practices survey do not have complete matching data from CII and Compustat or have missing data on key questions on the
survey, most analyses are conducted using a sample size of approximately 380 firms.
Compustat:  Compustat data was used to construct stock market valuation metrics and provide additional firm information not
covered by other sources.  Measures were created for total market value (market value of equity plus debt), property, plant and
equipment (PP&E), other assets, R&D assets, and advertising expense.
Overall, the full dataset includes 4,578 observations over eight years for market value and computer capital stock.  When we
match these data to the organizational practices surveys, we have complete organizational and market value data for 250 firms
for a total of 1,705 observations.
3. RESULTS
In this section, we perform regression and correlation analyses to test the four basic hypotheses outlined in the introduction.
First, we explore the basic relationship between IT and stock market value for our full sample of firms.  We examine the
relationship between computer capital and the adoption of specific organizational practices using correlation analyses and
construct a single variable, ORG, which captures most of the relevant variation in organization across firms.  Third, we
investigate the effect of ORG on firm market value.  Finally, we study how the combination of ORG and computers affect market
value.  We also perform a number of robustness checks of our analysis in each section.
Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang
6Among control variables, return on assets (ROA) is always significant and large. R&D to asset ratios and advertisement to asset ratios are not
always significant. Firm effects, industry effects, and year effects as separate groups are always strongly significant.
7In other words, the difference in intangible assets between highly computerized firms and less computerized firms is greater, on average, than
the difference within any single firm over time.
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3.1 Basic Findings for Computers and Market Value
The basic regression analyses (estimates of equation 7) for calculating the effect of computers on market value is shown in
Table 1.  In the first column, we present basic ordinary least squares results and find that each dollar of property, plant and
equipment (PP&E) is valued at about a dollar, and a dollar of other assets is valued at about $0.70.  Strikingly, each dollar of
computer capital is associated with over $15 of market value.  This implies that the stock market imputes an average of  $14 of
“intangible assets” to a firm for every $1 of computer capital.  All capital stock variables are significantly different from zero,
and the high R2 (~85%) suggests that we can explain much of the variation in market value across firms with our model.6
To probe this result further, we investigate how much the correlation between market value and computer investment is driven
by variation across firms, e.g., GM vs. Ford (a “between” regression), and variation for the same firm over time, e.g., GM in 1988
vs. GM in 1989 (a “within” or “firm effects” regression).  We find that both sources of variation are important but that the effect
due to variation between firms is larger. The “between” regression implies a market value of computer capital of nearly $20. For
the within regression, this value is $5 (but still strongly significant). The within regression can be interpreted as removing all
the effects that are unique to a particular firm but constant over time (equivalent to including every possible cross-sectional
control variable) so this suggests that factors unique to specific firms are important in determining the market value of
computers.7  Figure 1 and Figure 2 present the relative size of computer coefficients and those of other assets. 
Table 1.  Effects of Various Assets on Firms’ Market Valuation:
Baseline Regressions of Different Models
Market
Value
Pooled Fixed Effect Within Between
OLS w/Year wo/Year OLS
Computer Capital 15.192***1.158
5.076***
0.891
6.419***
0.839
19.218***
2.859
Physical Capital 0.967***0.020
1.147***
0.053
1.251***
0.053
0.960***
0.037
Other Assets 0.691***0.008
0.830***
0.012
0.829***
0.012
0.664***
0.018
Controls
ROA***
R&D
Adv
Year***
Industry***
ROA***
R&D
Adv
Year***
Firm***
ROA***
R&D
Adv
Firm***
ROA***
R&D
Adv
Industry***
R Square
Observations
0.8758
4578
0.729
4578
0.721
4578
0.887
4578
Key:  * - p < .1; ** - p < .05; *** - p < .01
Intangible Assets
8In other words, we exclude all firms which are missing any data in any year.
9LAD regression minimizes the absolute value of the deviation of the actual and fitted values, as opposed to the square of the difference as is
done for OLS.  Standard errors for the LAD estimates are done using bootstrapping techniques with 100 repetitions to obtain the empirical
distribution of the coefficient estimates.
10While a plot of regression residuals (not shown) suggests strong size-based heteroskedasticity, the results are changed very little with
alternative estimation methods.
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Table 2.  Effects of Various Assets on Firms’ Market Valuation:
Balanced Panel Only, Between and Wihtin Regression
Between Regression Fixed Effect Within Regression
OLS GLS LAD GLS LAD 2SLS
Computer
Capital
22.285***
4.193
18.540***
1.454
14.824***
3.545
5.584***
0.921
4.308***
1.154
9.945***
2.239
Physical
Capital
0.968***
0.049
1.014***
0.016
0.984***
0.019
1.244***
0.055
1.169***
0.113
1.069***
0.057
Other
Assets
0.654***
0.024
0.656***
0.010
0.652***
0.088
0.811***
0.015
0.814***
0.086
0.820***
0.015
Controls
ROA***
R&D
Adv*
Industry***
ROA***
R&D***
Adv***
Industry***
ROA***
R&D***
Adv***
Industry***
ROA***
R&D
Adv
Year***
Firm***
ROA***
R&D
Adv***
Year***
Firm***
ROA***
R&D
Adv
Year***
Firm***
R square
Observations
0.892
3312
0.069
3312
0.674
3312
0.681
3312
0.836
3312
0.670
3212
Key:  * - p < .1; ** - p < .05; *** - p < .01
In Table 2, we examine how robust this result is to variations in econometric methods.  For this analysis, we restrict the sample
to a balanced panel8 to get maximum data consistency and apply different regression techniques: generalized least squares (GLS)
and least absolute deviation (LAD) regression9 to control for heteroskedasticity, and two stage least squares (2SLS) to control
for reverse causality.  Overall, the basic results are consistent whether we use balanced or unbalanced panels and whether we
correct for heteroskedasticity using GLS or LAD in both between and within regressions.10
The last column of Table 2 addresses the possible bias due to reverse causality.  If investments in computer capital are very
responsive to changes in market valuation, then the coefficient estimate of computer capital may be biased upward.  The standard
method of eliminating bias due to reverse causality is to identify variables that predict IT investment for fundamental, long-term
reasons but are not affected by short term market fluctuations.  Normally this is very difficult, but in this context we have access
to computer prices, which are strong drivers of IT investment, but largely determined by fundamental technological progress
in the semiconductor industry and not transitory stock market fluctuations.
Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang
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Figure 1.  Relative Size of Market Valuation:  Between Estimates
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Figure 2.  Relative Size of Market Valuation:
Firm Effect Within Estimates
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11Our assumption that computer prices are driven by supply shifts and not demand is born out by a negative correlation between computer price
and quantity sold.  To capture the possibility that the responsiveness of computer investment to price (price elasticity) varies across industry,
we allow the price term to vary by industry (at the 2-digit SIC level).
12Results are similar when probit or ordered probit regression is used.  We report Spearman rank order correlations because they are easier to
interpret given the non-metric nature of most of our work system variables.
13Included are separate controls for mining/construction, high technology manufacturing (instruments, transportation, electronics, computers),
process manufacturing (paper, chemicals, petroleum), other non-durable manufacturing, other durable manufacturing, transport, utilities, trade,
finance, and services.
14Total central processing power does not include the processing power of personal computers.
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We first model the investment in computers as a function of price and other exogenous variables in our model to obtain a
predicted value of IT free from any reverse effects due to market.11  We then use this measure of computer capital.  
In this regression, the coefficient on computers is nearly doubled to $10. Thus, we find no evidence that the computer coefficient
is biased upward by endogeneity.  Although most of the other coefficients are similar, a Hausman test rejects the ordinary least
squares (OLS) specification in favor of 2SLS.  Therefore, if anything, the estimates in Table 1 and the rest of Table 2 appear to
be conservative.
These regressions provide strong support for hypothesis H1—computers are associated with a substantial amount of intangible
assets. Our estimates imply that these intangible assets dwarf the directly measured value of computer hardware that shows up
on the balance sheet.  In addition, the results on control variables and other factors give us confidence that our regression model
is consistent with prior expectations:  most other assets are worth approximately a dollar.  In addition, the results corroborate
an earlier exploratory analyses found by Yang (1994) using a different, smaller set of IT data from International Data Group.
Furthermore, the basic results do not appear to be upward biased by reverse causality.  Finally, the large difference between the
“between” and “within” regressions suggests substantial effects of firm-specific characteristics on the value of computer capital.
We will explore direct measures of one component of these organizational characteristics in the next section.
3.2 Basic Findings Regarding Role of Organizational Structure
In this section, we examine the correlation between computers and internal organization.  All correlations use Spearman rank
order correlations12 between various measures of computers and the organizational variables, controlling for firm size (employ-
ment), production worker occupation, and industry.13  Three different measures of IT are used, including the total value of IT
installed base (ITCAP), total central processing power14 in millions of instructions per second (MIPS), and number of personal
computers (TOTPC).  Multiple measures are employed because they capture slightly different aspects of computerization (for
example, MIPS measures centralized computing, while TOTPC measures decentralized computing).
In Table 3, we present correlations between multiple measures of IT and four dimensions of organizational design: use of teams
and related incentives, individual decision authority, investments in skills and education, and team-based incentives. Consistent
with Hypothesis 2, we find that across multiple measures of IT and multiple measures of organization, firms that utilize more
IT tend to use more teams, have broader job responsibilities, and allocate greater authority to their workers, even after controlling
for firm size and industry.
In addition to being correlated with IT, these practices are all correlated with each other.  Following Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1997)
we construct a composite variable (ORG) as the standardized (mean 0, variance 1) sum of the individual work practice variables.
This allows us to capture an organization’s overall tendency to use this collection of work practices in a single construct which
can be used for further analysis.  A principal components analysis, Table 4, shows that all components of this variable load highly
on a single factor (which explains approximately 35% of the variance of these measures), and a scree plot (not shown) suggests
Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang
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that this is the only non-noise factor.  The composite variable, ORG, is highly correlated with computerization.  Thus, we have
additional strong support for our second hypothesis.  In the remaining section of the results, we will explore the influence that
this cluster of practices has on the market value of the firm as well as the market value of computer capital.
Table 3.  Correlations Between IT Measures and Organizational Structure
Measure
(scale in parenthesis)
IT
Capital MIPS TOTPC
Structural Decentralization
Self-Managing Teams (1-5) .17*** .22*** .20***
Employee Inv. Grps (1-5) .07 .08 .08
Broad Jobs (1-5) .07 .12* .10*
Individual Decentralization
Pace of Work (1-3) .04 .06 .02
Method of Work (1-3) .16*** .20*** .15***
Composite:  7 Measures^ .12* .14** .16***
Individual Control^ .11* .15** .15**
Team Incentives
Team Building .15*** .19*** .18***
Promote for Teamwork .02 .10* .88
Skill Acquisition
Training (% staff) .14** .15*** .14**
Screen for Education (1-5) .16*** .18*** .21***
ORG Composite .24*** .30*** .25***
Spearman partial rank order correlations controlling for industry, employment, and production
worker occupation.  N = 300-372, depending on data availability.
Key: * - p < .1; ** - p < .05; *** - p < .01
^ - Limited to second and third waves of survey (N = 276)
Intangible Assets
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Table 4.  Unrotated Principal Components for ORG Variable Construction
Work Practices
Loading
First
Principal
Component
Loading
Second
Principal
Component
Self Managing Teams 0.751 0.008
Employee Involvement Groups 0.707 0.176
Decentralized Pace Decision 0.528 -0.628
Decentralized Method Decision 0.572 -0.456
Team Building 0.747 0.250
Promote for Teamwork 0.401 0.367
Screen for Education 0.466 -0.095
Training (% Staff Involved) 0.425 0.408
Percent of Variance Explained 24.8% 12.6%
3.3 Findings Regarding Effect of Organizational Structure on Market Value
3.3.1 Organization Variable in Market Value Equation
To this base equation, we also consider the effects of adding terms representing organizational characteristics such as human
capital and decentralized work systems.  We then investigate the direct relationship of these measures on market value as well
as their effect on the market value of computers through interaction terms. This yields the following estimating equation:
(8) Vit ’ "i % 8cKc,it % 8pKp,it % 8oKo,it % T1ORGi % T2ORG @ Kc,it % controls % ,it
A test of our third hypothesis (i.e., that organizational investments can be treated as intangible assets) is whether the ORG has
a positive contribution to market value.  Furthermore, if the estimated market value of IT drops when we include ORG in the
equation, it suggests that part of the high market valuation of IT in the previous regressions that were based on equation 7 was
due to a correlation with a previously unidentified and unmeasured organizational assets.  
A test of our fourth hypothesis (i.e., a positive synergy between IT and organizational investments) is to examine whether IT
is more valuable in high ORG firms; that is, testing the null hypothesis, T2 = 0 against T2 ß 0.
We examine several market value equations that also include the ORG variable as a measure of organizational capital in Tables 5,
6, and 7.  The first three columns in Table 5 report the same analysis of market valuation of computers with matched sub-sample.
The coefficients broadly coincide with the results from the larger sample shown in Tables 1 and 2.
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Table 5.  Effect of IT and ORG on Market Value
Matched Sample
Baseline Estimates
Adding ORG Variable
Alone
Pooled Within Between Between Pooled
Computer 10.901***1.578
7.946***
1.297
13.845***
4.213
8.487*
4.484
6.708***
1.588
ORG 506.0*271.2
529.5***
122.1
Physical Capital 0.921***0.034
1.540***
0.084
0.878***
0.078
0.749***
0.093
0.83138***
0.0385
Other Assets 0.867***0.027
0.770***
0.045
0.864***
0.064
0.902***
0.065
0.88359***
0.02631
Controls
ROA***
R&D***
Adv
Year***
Industry***
ROA***
R&D
Adv
Yar***
Firm***
ROA***
R&D**
Adv
NA
Industry***
ROA***
R&D**
Adv
NA
Industry***
ROA***
R&D***
Adv
Year***
Industry***
R Square
Observations
0.805
1705
0.741
1705
0.802
1705
0.805
1705
0.827
1705
When we simply add the ORG variable to the baseline market value equation, we find that it has a large and statistically
significant contribution as shown in Table 5 columns 4 and 5.  Firms that are one standard deviation above the mean in ORG,
have a market value that is about $500 million higher, ceteris paribus. Evaluated at the mean, one standard deviation of ORG
variable corresponds to the 8% increase in market value. The point estimate of computer capital coefficient drops about 40%.
This suggests that ORG is a substantial component of the previously unidentified “firm effect” that influences the value of IT.
The contribution of most of the other types of capital assets drops slightly, but not significantly.15 
3.3.2 Interaction Between Organization and Computers
Table 6 presents the results when both ORG and its interaction with computer capital are included in the regression.   The
magnitude of the interaction term between IT and ORG is about 7 in pooled estimation.  This strongly supports hypothesis 4.
In fact, it suggests that each dollar of computer capital is associated with an increase in market value of an additional seven
dollars in firms that are one standard deviation above average in ORG.16
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Table 6.  Effect of Interaction on Market Value
Market Value Pooled
Pooled
w/other
Interactions
Between
Between
w/other
Interactions
Computer 3.1122.082
3.077
2.181
7.151
4.652
6.747
4.777
ORG
251.**
123.9
230.2*
134.6
104.0
267.4
155.0
286.3
ORG x
Computer
6.909***
1.275
6.982***
1.465
9.433***
3.136
10.375***
3.771
ORG x
Physical Capital
0.019
0.032
-0.030
0.076
ORG x
Other Assets
-0.010
0.021
-0.005
0.050
Physical Capital 0.928***0.034
0.913***
0.042
0.880***
0.078
0.902***
0.096
Other Assets 0.815***0.028
0.823***
0.036
0.775***
0.069
0.784***
0.086
Controls
ROA***
R&D***
Adv
Year***
Industry***
ROA***
R&D***
Adv
Year***
Industry***
ROA***
R&D***
Adv
NA
Industry***
ROA***
R&D***
Adv
NA
Industry***
R Square
Observations
0.810
1705
0.810
1705
0.862
1705
0.862
1705
One possible explanation of these results is that ORG makes all types of capital more valuable and since capital investments tend
to be correlated with each other, we are erroneously attributing this all to computers.  When we include additional interaction
terms between ORG and Other Capital (columns 2 and 4 of Table 6), we find that this relationship is unique to computers: the
coefficients on the added interaction terms are not significant and there is little change in other coefficients.  This indicates that
ORG is an intangible asset that is particularly strongly associated with IT.
 
As the organization variable, ORG, is measured once per firm, we cannot apply fixed-effect model to estimate its coefficient.
However, since computers do vary over time, their interaction with ORG is time varying as well, which enables firm effects
estimation.  The results (shown in Table 7) suggest that evidence of an interaction between ORG and IT is evident even in the
firm effects analysis.  The coefficient is reduced although still borderline significant (p < .07), but when the direct computer
effect is also removed (which is highly collinear with the interaction term in this model), the coefficient rises to 4.4 and is
strongly significant and the R2 is little changed.  Thus, we can conclude that the market value of computerizing is substantially
higher in high ORG firms. 
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Table 7.  Effect of Interaction:  Firm Effect and Instrumental Variable Estimation
Market Value FirmEffects
Firm Effects
w/o Computer
Direct
Pooled
2SLS
Computer 4.425***1.967
7.221
7.382
ORG -135.3168.2
ORG x Computer 2.202*1.240
4.233***
0.851
17.897***
4.611
Physical Capital 1.467***0.088
1.476***
0.088
0.991***
0.066
Other Assets 0.718***0.047
0.722***
0.047
0.598***
0.047
Controls
ROA***
R&D
Adv***
Year***
Firm
ROA***
R&D
Adv***
Year***
Firm
ROA***
R&D
Adv***
Year***
Firm
R Square
Observations
0.743
1705
0.743
1705
0.790
1705
The final column of Table 7c shows the instrumental variable estimate.17  In this regression, the interaction becomes stronger
in magnitude and significance level suggesting that reverse causality is not leading to overestimates of the effect of computers
or their interaction with ORG. 
3.3.4 Non-parametric Estimation
The above results suggest that in high ORG firms each dollar of computer capital is associated with more intangible assets than
it is in centralized, low-skill firms.  If the stock market is valuing these firms properly, then this suggests that the benefits of
computerization are likely to disproportionately go to firms that are highly decentralized.
Figures 3 and 4 graphically capture this idea by plotting results from non-parametric regressions. Figure 3 is a level plot of fitted
values of market value regression on both computer capital and ORG variables, after netting out effects of other variables. Figure
4 is a contour plot from the same regression. We can see a clear picture of the interaction effect between computers and the ORG
variable, which captures most of decentralized work practices.  Firms that are high in IT and also high in ORG have much higher
market values than firms that have one without the other.
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Figure 4.  Market Value 3-D Plot by Organization and IT
Non-parametrically Estimated Values via a
Local Regression Model
Figure 4.  Market Value Contour Plot by
Organization and IT
Estimated Fitted Values via a Local Regression Model
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The organizational adjustment costs that firms lament
when installing computer capital, including costly in-
vestments in training, wrenching organizational change,
and conscientious relationship-building are not simply
wasted.  Instead, on average, they create intangible
assets that increase revenues but are difficult for com-
petitors to duplicate.  Therefore, our results demonstrate
that the costs of creating intangible assets should not
necessarily be viewed as expenses to be written-off, but
rather can be viewed as investments that create an on-
going revenue stream.
Our main results are consistent with each of the four
hypotheses described in the introduction:
• The financial markets put a very high value on
installed computer capital, substantially exceeding
the valuation placed on other types of capital.
• Computer-intensive firms have distinctly different
organizational characteristics, involving teams,
broader jobs, and greater decentralization of
decision-making.
• Firms with these organizational characteristics
have higher market valuations than their competi-
tors, even when all their other measures assets are
the same.
• Firms with both higher levels of computer invest-
ment and these organizational characteristics have
a disproportionately higher market valuations than
firms that are high on only one or the other dimen-
sion. 
These striking findings are quite robust to different data
sources, numerous different estimating equations, and
corrections for reverse causality. Taken together, these
results provide strong evidence that the combination of
computers and organizational structures creates more
value than the simple sum of these contributions sepa-
rately.
Our interpretation has focused on the assumption that
the stock market is approximately correct in the way it
values information technology and other capital investments.  The fact that our results apply to a broad segment of the economy
over nearly a full business cycle suggesting that fads, industry idiosyncrasies, and investor errors are not driving the results. In
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hypothesis that computer capital’s coefficient is equal to those of other types of capital.
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fact, year-by-by estimation shown in Table 8 indicates a consistently high valuation of computer capital throughout our period.18
Interestingly, productivity analysis by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1997) shows that the long run productivity benefits are approxi-
mately five times their capital cost, consistent with a valuation of IT five times higher than the valuation of ordinary capital.
By analyzing several hundred firms over a period of eight years, our research helps to document, analyze, and explain the extent
to which computerization is associated with both direct and indirect measures of intangible assets.   Furthermore, our methodol-
ogy enables use to understand the pattern of interactions among IT, organizational practices and market valuations, and thereby
detect complementarities.  If these assets are in fact becoming more important in modern economies, in part because of the
information revolution engendered by computers and communications, then it is incumbent upon us to understand not only
particular cases, but also any broader relationships and patterns that exist in the data.
In summary, our model and evidence support the hypothesis that installing computers is typically associated with the creation
of valuable, if previously unmeasured, organizational assets.  These organizational assets are evident both directly, in the
different work systems use by high IT firms, and indirectly, in the way that the financial market values  computer-intensive firms
proportionally higher.  The performance regressions suggest that the reason that IT is associated with these organizational assets
is not simply coincidence, but rather that they create more value when used together than when used separately.
Table 8.  Year-by-Year Fluctuation of Market Valuation
Years 1987-88 1989-90 1991-92 1993-94
Computer Capital 28.435***3.962
15.966***
3.483
21.082***
3.647
11.965***
1.665
Physical Capital 0.821***0.027
0.994***
0.034
1.024***
0.048
0.989***
0.042
Other Assets 0.655***0.015
0.672***
0.015
0.661***
0.022
0.719***
0.015
Contro.s
ROA***
R&D***
Adv
Year
Industry***
ROA***
R&D**
Adv**
Year
Industry***
ROA***
R&D
Adv
Year
Industry***
ROA***
R&D
Adv
Year**
Industry***
R Square
Observations
0.907
1090
0.909
1089
0.840
1182
0.887
1217
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Appendix A
Mathematical Notes
Derivation of the Estimating Equations
This mathematical note is a simpler variation of the appendix in Brynjolfsson and Yang (1997), which is in turn based on
Wildasin (1984). It extends the earlier work by providing some auxiliary derivations needed for the discussion of this paper.
We may assume that firms face the following dynamic optimization problem. 
(1) Maximize
I
V(0) ’ I40B(t)u(t)dt
(2) where B(t) ’ (F(K,N, t)&’(I,K,t))&N& I
(3) given dK
dt
’ I&j
J
j’1
*jKj
Here a firm maximizes its objective function, market value V(0) at time t = 0, which is equal to the discounted profit stream B(t)
by the discount factor u(t).  The decision variable is the investment vector I, and the constraint is the depreciation rule given in
the equation (3). F(K,N,t)) is the amount of output the firm can produce using capital input vector equal to K and variable input
vector equal to N. In addition, we posit that there is some adjustment costs taking the form of lost output ’(I,K,t).  *j is the
depreciation rate of the capital good Kj. All the variables except for time t and depreciation rate * are in dollar value. 
Then the hamiltonian of the optimization problem can be given:
(4) H(I,K,Nt)’ ((F(K,N, t)&’(I,K, t))&N& I)u(t)%8(I&j
J
j’1
*jKj)
Here the Lagrangian multiplier vector 8 represents the shadow value vector of one unit of each capital good; i.e., 8j is the shadow
value of capital good Kj.  If the valuation of financial markets is correct, 8j is the value of one additional unit of capital good Kj.
We assume the following to make the analysis simple.
(A1) F(K,N) and ’(I,K) are linear homogenous functions over (K,N) and (I, K) respectively. This assumption is equivalent
to constant to return to scale.
(A2) ’(I,K) are twice continuously differentiable in I and K.  ’(0,K) = 0, and  ’(I,K) $ 0;  ’I > 0, and  M2’/MIMIN are positive
definite.
A1 is nothing but the constant return to scale assumption and A2 captures the shape of adjustment cost function. It is increasing
in investment and convex in investment.
The first order conditions of the hamiltonian under these assumptions can be given:
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(F1) FN – l = 0,  where FN  is the partial derivative of F with respect to the vector N, and l is the vector of ones.
(F2)  8j  – (’j + 1)u = 0 for all j and t.
(F3) for all j and t08 ’ –(Fkj –’kj)u % 8j*i
And the transversality condition is:
(F4) lim
tß4
8(t)K(t) ’ 8(4)K(4) ’ 0
Let us consider economic interpretations of these conditions.  F1 is the familiar marginal productivity condition: the dollar values
of marginal product of inputs equal to its dollar value of the input.  F2, (l + ’I )u = 8, means that total cost of unit of investment
is the shadow value of that capital. Now from the transversality condition, we can write
Now from the transversality condition, we can write
(5) 8j(0)Kj(0) ’ 8j(0)Kj(0)&8j(4)Jj(4)’&I
4
0(8jKj%8j 0Kj)dt
Using the three first order conditions of the maximization problem, observe the following:
&( 08jKj % 8j 0Kj)
(6)
’ [(FKj Kj & ’Kj Kj&’Ij Ij)%jk (FNk Nk&Nk)]u
By the Euler’s theorem for the first degree homogeneous funcion G in vector X.
.LG(X)T X ’ j GXiXi’G(X)
Applying this theorem, since B is homogenous of degree one in in K, I, and N, we can obtain:
(7) j
J
j’1
8j(0)Kj(0) ’ I
4
0 ((F&’)&N& I)u(t)dt’I40B(t)u(t)dt’V(0)
High Market Value of IT Due to High Adjustment Costs
It is very easy to see if installment is costly, the installed capital worth more.  Let us see this more formally. 
By the homogeneity of degree one of the functions of ’(.), we can define:
((I/K) / ’(I,K)/K ’ ’(I/K,1);
Then ’I(I,K) = M’/MI = K M[’(K,I)/K]/MI = K M((I/K)/MI = K (N(I/K) 1/K = (N(I/K). By the assumptions of the adjustment
functions we know or can easily derive the following:
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(8) (N(I/K) > 0  < (N(I/K)
Now from one of the first order conditions, F2, we know the market value of one unit of capital goods is:
(9) ( = (’I + l) = (( + l) 
Let u = I/K, then 
(10) M8/Mu = (NN > 0 , by equation (8).
We just proved that the market value of one unit of capital good is higher when the investment rate is higher, ceteris paribus.
There may be another source of higher adjustment costs of IT investment. As IT is a new technology still being developed
rapidly, IT investments may accompany considerable changes in the structure and behavior of organizations. In our model, this
idea can be captured as (c > (o, computer capital’s adjustment cost function is monotonically larger than those of other types
of capital. If that is the case, by monotonic convexity of (, respectively; (Nc > (No.  According to equation (9), we can immedi-
ately see 8c > 8o.
Excess Marginal Product of IT Capital
The excess marginal product of computer capital also can be explained in the same framework.  The output function can be
restated as follows when adjustment costs take the form of foregone output. Let us assume that the adjustment cost function is
G(I ,K ,t) = Ej ’j(Ij ,Kj , t), additively separable.  Then the production function can be restated:
(11) Y(K,L,I,t) =  (F(K,L,t) – Ej ’j(Ij ,Kj , t) )
Now we assume  MF/MKj = MF/MKj for all i and j.  This assumption is for convenience only.  In a no adjustment cost economy,
there should be no excess returns on any specific capital.  Otherwise, firms would invest more on that capital to exploit away
the excess returns. We also assume ’j = ’i for all i and j.  The second assumption is temporary and harmless, and will consider
the relaxation of this assumption.  Then we can say that the first derivatives of all ’js with respect to Kj equal to ( as in the above
subsection. Under this formulation, the marginal product of each capital good is:
(12) YKi ’ (FKi & ’iKi ’ (FKi % (N(Ii /Ki) /Ki2)
The installed capital goods in the adjustment cost economy contribute to output in two ways: first, directly increasing output,
MF/MK; and secondly reducing adjustment costs of new investments, (N(I/K)/K2.  The computer capital’s excess return can be
viewed this way. 
If one capital good’s investment rate I/K is higher than that of others, then the marginal product of that capital should be higher
as  is monotonously increasing, ceteris paribus.  Also if the level of one capital good is smaller than that of other’s, the marginal
product is also higher.  These two conditions are exactly the case of computer capital.  Thus the second term of the above
equation is unambiguously larger for computer capital than for non-IT capital.  The model suggests that even when computer
capital is nothing special except for the rapid price decline, we should observe excess returns.  If computer capital’s adjustment
cost function is also monotonously larger than that of other capital’s as discussed in the above subsection, the excess returns
should go up more. If it is costly to install computer capital, the installed capital should earn more.  
This way of looking at the problem is so obvious that it is quite surprising hardly any researcher has yet formalized this idea.
There is another interesting merit of the above formulation.  Given the computer capital’s excess returns identified by some
researchers, we can actually estimate the adjustment cost parameters from equation (12).  
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Appendix B
Data Description
The variables used for this analysis were constructed as follow:
IT Capital.  We take total purchase value of computer equipment as reported by Computer Intelligence Corp. and deflate it using
an extrapolation of Gordon’s (1990) deflator for computers (price change -19.3% per year).
Physical Capital.  The source of this variable is Standard &Poor’s Compustat Annual Dataset. We consider two options to
construct the variable. The first is to construct the variable from gross book value of physical capital stock, following the method
in  Hall (1990). Gross book value of capital stock [Compustat Item #7 - Property, Plant and Equipment (Total - Gross)] is
deflated by the GDP implicit price deflator for fixed investment. The deflator can be applied at the calculated average age of the
capital stock, based on the three year average of the ratio of total accumulated depreciation [calculated from Compustat item #8 -
Property, Plant & Equipment (Total - Net)] to current depreciation [Compustat item #14 - Depreciation and Amortization].
Another method is just to use the net physical stock depreciation [calculated from Compustat item #8 - Property, Plant &
Equipment (Total - Net)]. In productivity literature the first method should be used, but in market value estimation we adopt the
second approach for the consistency with market value and other assets, which is measured in current dollars.  The dollar value
of IT capital (as calculated above) was subtracted from this result.  
Other Assets.  The other assets variable is constructed by the total asset [Compustat Annual Data item #6] minus physical capital
constructed above. This item includes receivables, inventories, cash, and other accounting assets such as goodwill reported by
companies.    
Return on Assets (ROA).  Compustat PC plus  mnemonic code ROAA, which is a two year moving average of return on assets.
R&D Asset Ratio. Constructed from R&D expenses [Compustat annual item #46]. Interestingly, this item includes software
expenses and armortization of software investment. R&D stock is constructed using the same rule in Hall (1993a, 1993b). She
applied a 15% depreciation rate, so we did. The final ratio is just the quotient of the constructed R&D stock and total assets. Less
than half of the firms in our sample report R&D expenses. The missing values are filled in using the average of the same industry
(SIC 4-digits).
Advertising Asset Ratio. Constructed from advertising expenses [Compustat annual item #45]. Less than 20% of our sample
of firms report the item. The same rule with R&D assets ratio is applied.
Market Value.   Fiscal year end s common stock value plus preferred stock value plus total debt.  In Compustat mnemonic code,
it is MKVALF + PSTK+DT, which represents total worth of a firm assessed by financial market.
Organization Variable (ORG).  The variable is constructed from survey items conducted by us in 1995 and 1996.  The
construction procedure using principal component analysis is described in the text. This variable captures the degree of new
organizational practices identified by Osterman (1994), MacDuffie (1995), and Huselid (1995).
Computer Price.  The source of the price of computers is the National Income Product Account (NIPA) by National U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA). This is quality adjusted price index described in Triplett (1989). 
